Some good news to all the companies that are being sued for allegedly violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because they contacted an individual after being notified that he or she is being represented by an attorney — a District Court judge in Illinois has granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss after it was accused of doing so, ruling the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because she did not suffer a concrete injury as a result of the communication.
A copy of the ruling in the case of Branham v. TrueAccord can be accessed by clicking here.
The plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to the defendant, informing it that she was being represented. The next month, the defendant sent two emails to the plaintiff, attempting to collect on the debt. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendant violated Sections 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692f, and 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA. In her complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the emails impinged on her choice of how to respond to the collection attempt, caused her undue stress and anxiety and wasted her time, and invaded her privacy.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, at which point the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The defendant then filed another motion to dismiss.
Judge Nancy L. Maldonado of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois goes into great detail outlining the ways in which the plaintiff’s claims are not specific or sufficient enough for her to rule that the plaintiff has standing to sue the defendant. Where Judge Maldonado goes into the most detail is in discussing the claim that the emails invaded the plaintiff’s privacy.
“The Court imagines there may be some circumstances where the receipt of numerous emails could create an intrusion on an individual’s peace and quiet akin to the kind of intrusion caused by the receipt of ‘pestiferous’ phone calls and text messages which courts have found sufficient to create standing,” Judge Maldonado wrote. “But Plaintiff here has made no allegations suggesting any such intrusion; she merely alleges that she received at least two emails and that those two emails created a ‘risk’ of an invasion of privacy. Without more, the Court agrees with TrueAccord that these allegations do not suggest an intrusion that is ‘highly offensive’ to a reasonable person such that Plaintiff’s injury is analogous to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.”