A Magistrate Court judge in Texas has granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss after it was sued for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act among other statutes, ruling that the plaintiff — who represented himself and did not respond to the defendant’s motion to dismiss — did not provide enough facts or evidence to back up his claim.
The Background: The plaintiff claimed the defendant was fraudulently furnishing information about a debt to the credit reporting agencies for seven months and that he he did not owe anything to the defendant and that the defendant profited from breaching the plaintiff’s trust and privacy.
The Ruling: Judge Andrew Edison of the District Court for the Southern District of Texas goes through each claim, one-by-one, and comes to roughly the same conclusion each time — that the plaintiff’s conclusory statements were not enough to survive the motion to dismiss.
- For example, the plaintiff claimed the defendant violated Section 1681 of the FCRA, but did not specify whether it was 1681s-2(a) or 1681s-2(b). Assuming the plaintiff meant 1681s-2(b) — because it’s the one that provides for a private right of action, the plaintiff needed to allege that the credit reporting agency notified the defendant about a dispute, but the plaintiff “makes no such allegation” which is “fatal” to his claim, Judge Edison wrote.
- Similarly, the plaintiff alleged the defendant violated Section 1692c of the FDCPA, but again failed to mention a subsection. Judge Edison assumed the claim to be a violating of 1692c(b) meaning communication with third parties, but the statement made by the plaintiff — the defendant “has purchased and trafficked [my] personal and financial information to unauthorized third parties without consent” — is “woefully insufficient” to overcome a motion to dismiss because it makes no reference to the third parties that saw his information.