In a case that was defended by Ethan Ostroff of Troutman Pepper, a District Court judge in Illinois has, for the second time, granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss after it was sued for allegedly violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by referencing “other charges” which might be accruing and affecting the balance owed by the plaintiff, because the letter was not specific enough as to what those other charges might represent.
A copy of the ruling in the case of Bryant v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., can be accessed by clicking here.
The plaintiff received a collection letter from the defendant, which included the following disclosure: “As of the date of this letter, you owe the above stated Account Balance. Because of interest and/or other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.” She filed suit, originally alleging the letter violated Section 1692g(1) of the FDCPA. That complaint was dismissed, after which the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this time alleging the letter violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA. The plaintiff’s claim was that the disclosure gave false, misleading, and deceptive information about the debt and the effect of not paying it. “Other charges,” claimed the plaintiff, could only be late fees, and because the defendant was not specific enough, the letter was deceptive.
The defendant argued that the language is factually accurate and that it was consistent with precedent within the Seventh Circuit. Judge Harry Leinenweber of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, agreed with the defendant on both fronts.
“Other charges” could mean “late fees” or “late charges,” noted the defendant, so using “other charges” is factually accurate, the defendant argued. As well, Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., confirmed that a collection agency does not have to itemize what counts as “other charges” in a collection letter, noted Judge Leinenweber.
Judge Leinenweber went on to note that while the complaint could be dismissed on this basis alone, the defendant was also correct in arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim. There was nothing in the amended complaint that indicated the defendant was prohibited from collecting any charges other than a late fee.
The plaintiff tried to raise a new argument in her response to the motion to dismiss, but Judge Leinenweber did not allow the new claim to proceed. He also refused to grant an “improper” request for the plaintiff to file another amended complaint.